Although North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops cooperated and occasionally conducted joint operations, they usually operated in different areas. 2023, A&E Television Networks, LLC. Direct Action: The Johnson Commitments, 19641968. The same can be said had U.S. forces ignored the large NVA divisions that roamed the Central Highlands and border areas of the DMZ, Laos, and Cambodia. Half of the 84,000 Communists deployed during the Tet offensive were killed in action or captured following the campaign. In 1971, terrorist acts declined by 75 percent in more secure areas and 50 percent in areas classified as less secure.87 The inaccessibility to the people, defections, desertion rates, and the inability to operate freely in the countryside drastically hampered the Viet Congs ability to remain combat effective. CAP Marines and South Vietnamese paramilitary forces preparing for an ambush against the Viet Cong. USMACV Office of CORDS, MR 1, Phuong Hoang Division, General Records 205-57: Neutralization Correspondence 1969 thru 205-57: Overview Files 1969, Memorandum I Corps Field Overview (RCS-MACCORDS-32.01) for October 1969, box 3, Records of the U.S. Cu Chi Tunnels - Facts, History & Length Problems of a North Vietnamese Regiment, 4. The program had offices in all the countrys provinces and districts (figure 5). PDF Tactics in the Vietnam war - WordPress.com Vietnam was a hybrid warfare theater, which required the Americans to fight both the Viet Cong guerrillas and Hanois conventional forces. Viet Cong Facts | Britannica Birth of the Office of CORDS: Original Obstacles and Setbacks. For instance, in 1969, the U.S. Armys 173d Airborne Brigade launched a counterinsurgency campaign in Binh Dinh that was an exact replica of the Corps CAP.59 In Quang Ngai, U.S. Army units launched the Infantry Company Intensive Pacification Program, another copy of the CAP.60 While it remains speculative, it is unlikely that Westmoreland would have gone so far as to allow a whole U.S. infantry brigade to emulate the Corps CAP system. The initiative was first proposed by Komer and his deputy, William E. Colby, who would become Komers successor as the head of CORDS. A COSVN Directive for Eliminating Contacts with Puppet Personnel and Other Complex Problems, 3. The change was mainly due to William Colby, who refocused the programs priorities. South Vietnamese detachments were overwhelmed and routed by the Communists.33 Small platoon units conducting counterinsurgency are not suited to confront heavily armed battalions supported by artillery and mortar fire. Keywords: S. Army Art Collection. American "victories" were empty . Under General Abramss leadership, USMACVs focus would not be on firepower but instead on Vietnamizationwhich aimed at progressively letting the ARVN take over the lead in the warand small unit operations. HO CHI MINH CITY, Vietnam (AP) _ The United States would have branded Doan Thi Ahn Tuyet a classic Viet Cong terrorist - a diminutive, smiling Saigon schoolgirl who threw grenades and planted explosives to kill Americans and their South Vietnamese allies. In more recent years, the term hybrid warfare was used to describe how Hezbollah fought the Israeli Army in 2006 and how the Russian military operated in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. Le Duan appointed one of his most trusted military commanders, General Nguyen Chi Thanh, as leader of the COSVN. CORDS counterinsurgents would unavoidably be targeted by fully armed regular Viet Cong battalions and possibly by the NVA, a fact that Komer anticipated in the early stages of the programs development. Komer was at the head of a program that brought under a single umbrella every military and civilian organization charged with carrying out pacification in South Vietnam. What was one advantage the Viet Cong guerillas had? 45K views The Vietnam War The Vietnam War started as a conflict between Vietnam and France, which had colonized parts of Southeast Asia in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Always the Rice Paddies - Fix Bayonets! Phoenixs primary objective was to eliminate the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). U.S. regular units shielded the counterinsurgents from the remainder of the insurgencys battalions, leaving the guerrillas to fend for themselves. In the past decades, most conformist studies dedicated to the Vietnam War were overly critical of the U.S. militarys so-called reliance on conventional warfare in a country deemed to be plagued by an insurgency. During the Vietnam War, the Viet Cong acted as the military arm of the National Liberation Front (NLF), a communist-leaning political organization created to overthrow the democratic government of South Vietnam. Lewis Sorley criticized Westmorelands so-called reluctance in executing counterinsurgency in Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam.15 On the other hand, revisionist historians such as Gregory Daddis emphasized that USMACVs commanding officer was fully aware of the importance of pacification and conceptualized his battleplan accordingly.16 The U.S. Army general was not a stranger to counterinsurgency doctrines. In II Corps, the G2 established a branch specifically dedicated to collecting and analyzing intelligence related to the VCI.79 In I Corps, the intelligence gathered by CAP Marines greatly supported Phoenixs efforts against the VCI. There was a high degree of rivalry and distrust between the Lao Dong (Workers) Party leaders in Hanoi and Communist leaders in the South. Forces in Southeast Asia/Headquarters, 19501975, NND 994025, RG 472, NARA, 12, 1011, hereafter A Study of Pacification and Security in Cu Chi District. "Tunnel rats," as American soldiers who worked in the Cu Chi tunnels during the Vietnam War were known, used the evocative term "black echo" to describe the experience of being in the tunnels. Viet Cong (VC), in full Viet Nam Cong San, English Vietnamese Communists, the guerrilla force that, with the support of the North Vietnamese Army, fought against South Vietnam (late 1950s-1975) and the United States (early 1960s-1973). USMACV Office of CORDS, MR 2 Phuong Hoang Division, General Record Operation Phung Hoang Rooting Out the Communists Shadow Government, box 4, Records of the U.S. Provinces and military regions (Corps) of South Vietnam. Until the end of 1968, conventional forces paid little attention to the counterinsurgents who struggled to accomplish their tasks when confronted with fully armed Communist battalions. Ngo Dinh Diem to belittle the rebels. Through the analysis of U.S. and Communist documents, this study suggests that the Americans succeeded in offsetting the Communists tactical approach to hybrid warfare. Its success in defeating the Viet Cong insurgency was accomplished in the Spring of 1972.90. The committee admitted that their forces were poor in quality and quantity and unable to establish contact with the population. Villages were also part of this network. Courtesy of Ismal Fournier, based on a chart in Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (1966), 30. As stated by CORDS veteran Stephen Young: A remarkable success in the development of associative power to defeat a powerful insurgency was achieved [with] the CORDS program. Such a decision results in large scale military operations based on flawed intelligence, according to Thompson, which usually allows the guerrillas to avoid contact with the enemy. Organization and structure of CORDS Start Military History January 15, 2018 Beautiful Waters was a fairly typical village in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam. Fighting as a guerrilla was attractive: it would allow men more freedom than they would enjoy in the regular army, and most importantly, would allow them to remain at home to defend their families and communities. John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002), xxii. Although the CAP system proved effective in a guerrilla war context, the situation became quite different once conventional military forces came into action, especially during the Tet offensive in 1968. While a whole paper could be written on the discipline problems related to CORDS when Komer launched the program, this article focuses on the threat posed by the large guerrilla formations. To do so, U.S. advisors attached to CORDS mentored and supervised their South Vietnamese counterparts without being excessively involved, which enabled the South Vietnamese to progressively become self-reliant and autonomous. Doing so would result in the failing of the foreign forces main task: build up the local governments administrative machinery and the experience of the individuals meant to take over the campaign.37 Under the local district committees leadership, the Communist political cadres (A) embedded with the population are responsible for increasing the insurgent groups control over the villagers. Saturation bombing Herbicides such as Agent Orange were used mainly to. In 1969, the number of refugees fell to 114,000 for the entire country.63 During that same year, another counterinsurgency initiative was attached to CORDS. Furthermore, subsequent spring offensives dubbed mini-Tet inflicted more heavy casualties on the Viet Cong. The ARVN was routed by the North Vietnamese military, which took Saigon on 29 April 1975. Frequently the Viet Cong attacked at night, withdrawing afterward to the security of the jungle. Based on a chart in Background and Draft Materials for U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968. Large scale ground operations involving tens of thousands of troops were launched. What advantages might guerrillas have in a civil war? Finally, the fourth phase sought to oppose the Communist dictatorship by launching elections in the villages, according to Young.53 Following Colbys briefing, Abrams gave his full approval and support to the initiative, which was also approved by President Thieu.54 The latter took the APC very seriously and regularly inspected the villages with his prime minister to assess the programs progress. The Communist political cadres links with Viet Cong fighters and villagers. HISTORY.com works with a wide range of writers and editors to create accurate and informative content. Nguyen Van Thieu in the spring of 1975, the PRG assumed power as the government of South Vietnam. COSVNs Preliminary Report on the 1969 Autumn Campaign, 12, 67. Forces in South East Asia, 19501975, NND 974305, RG 472, entry 33104, NARA, 13. III MAF, Marine Combined Action Program in Vietnam by LtCol W. R. Corson, USMC, box 152, Records of the U.S. Marine Corps 1775, RG 127, NND 984145, NARA, 186, hereafter Marine Combined Action Program in Vietnam by Lt Col W. R. Corson, USMC. Viet Cong, the guerrilla force that, with the support of the North Vietnamese Army, fought against South Vietnam (late 1950s-1975) and the United States (early 1960s-1973). A Study of Pacification and Security in Cu Chi District, 12, 1011. Communist conventional forces could no longer afford to assist the guerrilla cadres and fighters in the villages. The relationship between guerrilla war and regular mobile warfare was not properly exploited, which disrupted the insurgents ability to properly execute their mission in the villages.49 In such a hybrid warfare scenario, all sides (U.S. forces, ARVN, and Communists) had to synch their conventional and nonconventional military unit operations if they hoped to increase their prospect for victory. After 1954 they were joined by former elements of the southern Viet Minh, a communist-oriented nationalist group. A COSVN report complained about the significant damage inflicted on them by the PRUs and the Chieu Hoi defector program.69 The COSVN admitted that VCI defection increased by 49 percent in the second half of 1968. ProQuest folder 003233-001-0131. Phoenixs attrition rate on VCI members forced the COSVN to deploy new, young, inexperienced cadres, totally lacking their predecessors expertise. In heavily bombed areas, people spent much of their life underground, and the Cu Chi tunnels grew to house entire underground villages, in effect, with living quarters, kitchens, ordnance factories, hospitals and bomb shelters. In January 1966, some 8,000 U.S. and Australian troops attempted to sweep the Cu Chi district in a large-scale program of attacks dubbed Operation Crimp. In 1967, he participated in a veritable bureaucratic struggle to force military planners to better coordinate their efforts to properly support the paramilitary forces and government cadres deployed in rural South Vietnam.44 Earlier in 1966, during the Manila Conference, President Lyndon B. Johnson and his South Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Van Thieu agreed that ARVN forces should shift the bulk of their efforts to support pacification.45 Some U.S. and ARVN battalions assigned to assist the counterinsurgents managed to keep large Viet Cong units at bay. For instance, many Viet Cong members resisted Le Duans wishes to turn the insurgency into a conventional fighting force.12 The differences between the two groups were also ideological in nature. Today, Mrs. Tuyet, an army captain who stands well under 5 feet even with her . The ensuing chain reaction results in platoons rapidly growing into companies. Le Duan sought to ensure his control of insurgent operations and stifle any opposition to his policies. Counterinsurgents denied the insurgents ability to rely on their cadres, who struggled to operate in their designated areas of operations. ProQuest folder 003233-001-0731. It also sent hundreds of thousands of American soldiers into South Vietnam to fight Viet Cong guerrillas (small groups of fighters who launch surprise attacks) and North Vietnamese troops. Richard M. Nixon, Sir Robert Thompson (1971) Memorandum for the President, Subject: Sir Robert Thompson Comments on Vietnam, Presidential Materials Project, folder 102564-018-0391, NARA, 1. The initiative managed to cut off the Viet Cong guerrillas from the rural population and reinstated security and stability in several areas of northern South Vietnam. Other seized documents exposed the Communists growing loss of rural area control. Viet Cong | Dafato - it's a Fact Until the end of 1968, conventional forces paid little attention to the counterinsurgents who struggled to accomplish their tasks when confronted with fully armed Communist battalions. CONF., SAIGON 1970 thru 1603-03(C): MISC RPTS. Such a course of action is essential if any counterinsurgency hopes to succeed in the long term. Following CORDSs success in 1972, the Viet Cong was no longer an indigenous organization. Communist forces occupied the peoples houses, dug up trenches, and set up defensive positions that several companies could occupy.22 Such a situation resulted in multiple firefights in the vicinity of rural villages. Comme l'indique le galon de bless sur son uniforme, cette photo fut prise aprs 1918, le service d'Ormsby ayant pris fin. Our editors will review what youve submitted and determine whether to revise the article. incident in which American troops killed from 175 to 400 Vietnamese villagers domino theory the fear that if one nation falls to communism, its neighbors will soon follow Vietnamization policy of replacing American forces with South Vietnamese soldiers escalation North Vietnams leader, Ho Chi Minh, admitted that he was much more worried about the U.S. military successes against the VCI than those obtained against his regular forces.75 When peace talks began between Washington and Hanoi in Paris, Communist officials demanded the cessation of all operations related to the Phoenix Program.76 While Phoenix was indeed dreaded by the insurgents, the programs successes were far from instantaneous. The North Vietnamese regular forces, far from being decimated like the Viet Cong, took charge of military operations and launched the spring offensive, a major multidivisional blitzkrieg campaign designed to destroy the ARVN and regain the initiative following U.S. combat forces departure from South Vietnam. A few months later, confronted with its subordinates inability to follow the directives of Resolution 9, the COSVN published Resolution 14, which insisted again on the need to revert to a guerrilla warfare concept to overcome the enemys pacification program. In the spring of 1975, the NVA launched a new multidivisional campaign with new Soviet-supplied tanks and artillery. exhaustion. Modification to the III MAF Combined Action Program in the RVN, 19 December 1968, box 119, Records of the U.S. Marine Corps 1775, RG 127, NND 9841145, NARA, C-9C-10. USMACV Office of CORDS, MR 2 Phuong Hoang Division, General Records 1602-08: US/GVN Insp Team Visits, JulyDecember 1970 thru 1603-03A (A4), box 7, Records of the U.S. American Soldiers and Marines fought across all kinds of terrain during the Vietnam War, from mountain peaks to urban sprawl. USMACV Office of CORDS, MR 2 Phuong Hoang Division, General Records 207-01: Reorganisation 1970 thru 1602-08: GVN INSP RPTS 1970 MACCORDS Realignment of Phuong Hoang Management Responsibilities, box 5, Records of the U.S. Several schools of thought identified similar branches or types of warfare that can also be associated with Vietnam. Human intelligence remained Phoenixs key asset. At this point, Viet Cong leadership acknowledged that it was incapable of regaining the initiative against the counterinsurgents and admitted that government forces had the upper hand. HISTORY reviews and updates its content regularly to ensure it is complete and accurate. Communist forces began digging a network of tunnels under the jungle terrain of South Vietnam in the late 1940s, during their war of independence from French colonial authority. Ismal Fournier served 19 years in the Canadian armed forces. This article opposes these theories and suggests that by 1969, the U.S. forces reliance on conventional warfare against the guerrillas progressively morphed into a strategy that fully supported the militarys counterinsurgency initiatives. As it fought against one of the finest conventional militaries of the time, USMACV had to develop a counterinsurgency plan to simultaneously neutralize what was perhaps the most efficient and battle-hardened insurgency of the twentieth century. Forces in Southeast Asia, 19501975, NND 994025, RG 472, NARA. Figure 3. Articles with the HISTORY.com Editors byline have been written or edited by the HISTORY.com editors, including Amanda Onion, Missy Sullivan, Matt Mullen and Christian Zapata. Should the insurgents be caught in the open and sustain heavy casualties, any loss suffered by units B and C will be replaced by the political cadres who will promote B members to the C category. Its political cadres sought to control every facet of the peoples lives toward the insurgencys support and competed with Saigon to control the population. North Vietnamese retaliated against a U.S. Navy ship, believing it had helped in the raids. Counterinsurgency programs were labeled weak and powerless to shift the Americans momentum against the Viet Cong, which outsmarted the U.S. military. Later in the 1990s, Thomas Uber elaborated the theory of compound warfare, characterized by what he termed the simultaneous use of regular and guerrilla forces against an opponent. US/GVN Insp. All articles are regularly reviewed and updated by the HISTORY.com team. In the first years of its combat involvement, USMACV acted instinctively as it tracked the large Communist battalions while it neglected to target the insurgencys shadow government. The NVA operated in the vicinity of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), the Central Highlands, and near the borders of Laos and Cambodia, while the Viet Cong deployed its main force in the populated areas located in South Vietnams lowlands. For the most part, the Viet Cong fought essentially a guerrilla war of ambush, terrorism, and sabotage; they used small units to maintain a hold on the countryside, leaving the main population centres to government authorities. The Vietnam War: Was it Necessary? | RallyPoint In some areas there were even large theaters and music halls to provide diversion for the troops (many of them peasants) and their supporters. The once-powerful insurgency would assume no significant role in what was to bring about the fall of South Vietnam. Forces in Southeast Asia, 19501975, NND 003062, RG 472, entry PSG, NARA, 78. The III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) operated in I Corps and was led by General Lewis W. Walt. In the heart of the villages, RD cadres that would usually dismantle the insurgencys political infrastructure were too frightened to operate in the districts hamlets proactively.50 No elections occurred in the villages controlled by the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong (can be abbreviated as VC, sometimes spelled as Vietcong), officially the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, was an armed communist organization in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.It fought under the direction of North Vietnam against the South Vietnamese and United States governments during the Vietnam War.It had both guerrilla and regular army units, as well as a . Porch also stated that the U.S. Army lacked a mindset and institutional structure to learn and adjust its doctrine and tactics to achieve success.11 These historians most common argument regarding CORDS is that while the initiative was commendable, it was ultimately overshadowed by USMACVs overreliance on firepower and conventional military doctrines against the guerrillas. Courtesy of Ismal Fournier. Through the analysis of U.S. and Communist documents, this study suggests that the Americans succeeded in offsetting the Communists tactical approach to hybrid warfare. While he had no field experience in counterguerrilla warfare, his lack of practical knowledge did not detract from his interest in the matter. Forces in Southeast Asia, 19501975, NND 974305, RG 472, entry 33104, NARA, 2, hereafter US/GVN Insp Team Visits, JulyDecember 1970 thru 1603-03A (A4). To support the South's government, the United States sent in 2,000 military advisors--a number that grew to 16,300 in 1963. As technology evolves, so do the tools available to wage war. Viet Cong Step Up Guerrilla Warfare - JSTOR As they control the population, the political cadres (A) are responsible for providing food, logistics supplies, recruits, and intelligence to the district committee and combat units (B and C). Former CORDS advisor Stephen B. In 1972, the Viet Cong was effectively defeated by a proper equilibrium of counterinsurgency and regular warfare. Chapter 31 Flashcards | Quizlet Since then, he completed his PhD in history at Laval University in Quebec, Canada, and retired from the military. However, a key event was on the verge of shifting the battles momentum in favor of CORDS. A VCI deserter admitted that the Viet Cong feared Phoenix, which was trying to destroy its organizations and denied its cadres access to the civilian population.72 He also stated that insurgents who did not have to deal with villagers received very specific instructions: contacts with the population were prohibited due to Phoenix agents overwhelming presence in rural areas. In retrospect, the South Vietnamese success with CORDS should not come as a surprise. To take advantage of the situation, the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), an expansion of the CORDS program, was launched in November 1968. However, the Viet Congs losses against conventional military forces ruined the COSVNs prospect for success. Members of the VCI embodied the political arm of the insurgency. Moreover, a thorough analysis of Westmorelands papers clearly shows that the U.S. Army general had, indeed, a solid battle plan that aimed to conduct counterinsurgency alongside conventional operations in Vietnam.20 However, proper execution of such a plan was the problem given the threat posed by fully armed Viet Cong regiments and battalions. Before the French colonial occupation, about two-thirds of the land was owned by the village. The U.S. Armys leadership was obsessed with units B and C while neglecting the political cadres (A) that allowed the insurgency to thrive and remain operational. In the years following the fall of Saigon in 1975, the Vietnamese government preserved the Cu Chi tunnels and included them in a network of war memorial parks around the country. The early insurgent activity in South Vietnam against Diems government was initially conducted by elements of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai religious sects. 1775, Hybrid Warfare in Vietnam The U.S. and South Vietnamese Success Against the Viet Cong Insurgency. However, given the South Vietnamese Armys poor state in 1975, the prospect of an ARVN victory against fully trained and supplied NVA divisions was hopeless. From Hanoi, North Vietnamese leader Le Duan closely monitored the insurgent movement in the south through the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), which superseded the Viet Cong in authority and acted as the organizations main headquarters. Vietnam Documents and Research Notes Series: Translation and Analysis of Significant Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Documents, microfilm. North Vietnamese and VC troops slipped back within months of the sweep, and in early 1968 they would use the tunnels as a stronghold in their assault against Saigon during the Tet Offensive. Therefore guerrilla warfare challenged the United States to win not by the amount of land gained but rather by increasing the number of casualties. His forces were subordinated to Westmorelands USMACV, whose units operated in II, III, and IV Corps (figure 2). Throughout the Vietnam War, the Vietcong repeatedly proved themselves to be a formidable enemy, due in large part to their use of guerrilla warfare, something that the U.S. troops were not very . In Quang Tri Province, PRU actions caused such damage to the VCI that the Communists deployed a special commando unit specifically trained to destroy a PRU operating base.68 The U.S. and South Vietnamese managed to incapacitate one of Hanois hybrid warfare organs when it defeated the insurgency. USMACV Office of CORDS, MR 1 Phuong Hoang Division, General Records 204-57: Quang Nam Correspondence 1969 thru 204-57: Rifle Shot Operations 1969, 173d Airborne Brigade Participating in Pacification in Northern Binh Dinh Province, box 5, Records of the U.S. Forces in South East Asia, 19501975, NND 974306, RG 472, entry 33104, NARA. . The Corps overall mission encompassed six objectives: 1) destroy the villages Viet Cong political infrastructure; 2) protect residents and maintain public order; 3) protect village infrastructure and development; 4) defend the area and the lines of communication on the villages perimeter; 5) organize an intelligence-gathering network among the civilian population; and 6) participate in civic actions and conduct psychological operations to turn the civilian population against the Viet Cong. Expose Viet Cong hiding places Although rice paddies were but one landscape in-country, they serve as a powerful and evocative symbol of the conflict.
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